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control of the power within the administration. So guards assigned to be present
at self-help meetings started making derogatory remarks and being insolent to
outside people attending programs. This
further reduced the attendance of the
community volunteers (not the inmate
visitors) from coming into the programs
because they didn't feel they had to put
up with rudeness and insults to assist in a
program they were volunteering their
time for.
After the riots in the Maryland prison
in 1972 the administration closed all of
the self-help groups and claimed they
were a contributing cause of the riots. It is
true that a handful of inmates were abusing the self-help meetings, but in no way
did it ever reach the proportions claimed
by the custodial force. What is more of a
question to me is why the administration
permitted the programs to reach a point
of degeneration? Furthermore, if guards
did witness contraband being brought
into the institution, why was there never
an inmate (that I know of) charged with
an infration of institutional rules?
If you have read this far I hope that
you will also wonder what is going on in
our correctional system, and that you
will take the time to take another look.

•

Warrantless
Arrests
by Lindsay Schlottman
Henry Ogle Watson was arrested
without a warrant on August 23, 1972
during a meeting in a public restaurant
with Mr. Khoury (an informer of known
reliability). Six days prior to this meeting
Khoury had telephoned a postal inspector, informing the inspector that Watson
possessed a stolen credit card and had
approached Khoury about using the
card to their mutual advantage. Learning that Watson was going to supply additional cards, the inspector asked
Khoury to set up a meeting with Watson.
Such a meeting, planned for August 22,
was postponed by Watson to August 23,
Khoury was instructed to light a cigarette
atthis meeting if he learned from Watson
that Watson had additional credit cards.
Khoury lit the cigarette, whereupon
postal officers arrested Watson without a
warrant and Watson was removed to the
street and given his Miranda rights. Watson's person was searched and no credit
cards were found. The postal inspector
then asked Watson for permission to
search his car which was in view. Watson
said "Go ahead" and when the inspector said "If I find anything, it is going to
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go against you," Watson again replied
"Go ahead." United States v. Henry
Ogle Watson, 44 L.W. 4112 (January
26, 1976). Two credit cards were found
under a floor mat. Watson subsequently
was charged with possessing stolen mail
(in violation of 18 USc. § 1708), a
felony.
Prior to his trial, Watson moved to
have the cards suppressed, claiming the
arrest and the search were illegal (the arrest because there was no probable
cause and no arrest warrant; the search
because Watson had not been told he
could withhold consent). The federal district court convicted Watson for illegally
possessing the two cards.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's conviction, basing the reversal on the inadmissibility of the two cards. Specifically,
the Court of Appeals held that Watson's
arrest was illegal because the postal inspector failed to obtain an arrest warrant,
although there was time to do so.
Further, the Court of Appeals held that
the consent to search by Watson was
coerced and therefore an invalid ground
for the warrantless search of the car. United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849
(1974).
The Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice White (Justice Stevens
taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case), reversed the Court of
Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court
first decided the issue of the validity of
the warrantless arrest.
The statutory basis of the authority of
postal inspectors to make warrantless arrests is embodied in 18 USc. § 3061
(a). The Board of Governors of the
Postal Service is expressly empowered
to authorize (which it does by regulation
39 CFR § 232.5 (a) (1975) ) Postal Service officers and employees who perform inspection duties to
"(3) make arrests without warrant for
felonies cognizable under the laws of
the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested had committed or is
committing such a felony." Watson,
44 LW 4112,4113, citing § 3061 (a)
(1976).
The Court states that probable cause

existed that a § 1708 offense was being
committed and therefore the inspector
and subordinates had the proper statutory authority to arrest Watson without a
warrant. In determining whether the arrest comported with the Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court reviewed legal history.
First the Court emphasized the congressional nod to postal inspectors making warrantless arrests on probable
cause which is embodied in the enactment of § 3061. In a footnote, previous
decisions on this issue were discussed
and it was pointed out that
"In 1968 in the face of confusion generated by these decisions and two
striking down warrantless arrests by
postal inspectors as not authorized by
federal statute or by state law... (citations omitted), the Congress enacted
18 U.s.c. § 3061 to make clear that
postal inspectors are empowered to
arrest without warrant upon probable
cause (citation to congreSSional records omitted)." Watson, 44 L.W
4112, 4113, n.4 (1976). [emphasis
added]
In short, the Court paid deference to
congressional judgment and accepted
such a provision as being reasonable
and constitutional because of the "strong
presumption of constitutionality due to
an Act of Congress." Watson, 44 L.W
4112, 4113 (1976), citing United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948).
Next, earlier Supreme Court decisions
were analyzed, with the conclusion that
"there is nothing in the Court's prior
cases indicating that under the Fourth
Amendment a warrant is required to
make a valid arrest for a felony." Watson, 44L,W 4112, 4113-4115 (1976).
The Gerstein case was cited as support
for the determination that the warrant
requirement for all arrests would impose
an "intolerable handicap" on law enforcement procedures. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,113 (1975). The
crux of the matter is whether there is
probable cause for the arrest, not
whether there is a warrant or time to get
one. Watson, 44 L.W 4112, 4114
(1976).
For further support, the Court looked
to common law and state constitutions

and statutes which adopted the following common law rule:
" ... that a peace officer was permitted
to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or a felony committed in
his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was
reasonable grounds for making the arrest." Watson, 44 L.W 4112, 4114
(1976).
Early state cases construing this rule
were discussed (Rohan v. Sawin, 59
Mass. (5 Cush.) 281 (1851); Wakeley v.
Hart, 6 Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814); and
others).
The Court then noted that in 1792
Congress provided that federal marshals
had the power to execute the laws equal
to that of state sheriffs. This power has
been cited in statutes up to the present
time where, by recent statutes, federal
marshals specifically are given authority
to make warrantless. arrests for felonies
on probable cause. In short, the Court is
pointing to another congressional nod to
warrantless arrests by federal authorities.
As another basis for the conclusion
that Watson's arrest was legal, the Court
looked to state legislation. Almost all
states expressly authorize felony arrests
on probable cause without a warrant.
Also, the American Law Institute has
formulated a model statute which, in §
120.1 of A Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure:
" ... authorize[s] an officer to take a
person into custody if the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a
felony, or has committed a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor in
his presence." Watson, 44 L.W.
4112,4115 (1976).
The Court then returned to congressional approval of warrantless arrests.
FBI agents, who have authority to make
warrantless arrests, are so authorized
only upon exigent circumstances. Watson, 44L.W. 4112, 4115, n.13 (1976).
In concluding the opinion on Watson's arrest, the Supreme Court
categorized the argument that arrest
warrants should be sought where practicable to do so as "judicial preference."
Watson, 44L.W 4112,4116 (1976). In
short, based on legal history (common

law, state constitutional and statutory
precedents, federal legislation and Supreme Court decisions), the Court concluded that even where exigent circumstances do not exist warrantless arrests may be proper.
The Supreme Court simply determined that because Watson's consent to
the search of his car wasn't the product
of an illegal arrest, and further, because
the Court of Appeals resolved the issue
of voluntariness of Watson's consent on
the basis of an illegal arrest, that his consent should be reviewed. In a cursory
manner, the Court looked over the details of the consent and decided that the
fact of the arrest plus the failure of postal
authorities to inform Watson that he
could withhold consent to the search did
not result in his consent being involuntary. The search was therefore found to
be valid.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist
joined in Justice White's opinion.
Justice Stewart filed a brief opinion
concurring in the result in which he
stated that the arrest which was based
upon probable cause, made in a public
place and not in a private place and in
broad daylight, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
Justice Powell wrote a concurring
opinion in which he noted that the case
could be disposed of on the ground that
Watson's consent to the search was voluntary, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973), even assuming the
warrantless arrest was unconstitutional,
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963). However, he focused on
the arrest to determine its validity.
The decision of the Court has created
"a certain anomaly," stated Justice
Powell,
" ... by its being the first square holding
that the Fourth Amendment permits a
duly authorized law enforcement officer to make a warrantless arrest in a
public place even though he had
adequate opportunity to procure a
warrant after developing probable
cause for arrest." Watson, 44 L.W.
4112,4117 (1976).
Justice Powell emphaSized that warrantless searches are outside the Constitu-
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tion except in a few limited circumstances; thus the seizure of the person, "the taking hold of one's person,"
should logically be limited in the same
manner. Watson, 44 L. W. 4112, 4117
(1976). He, however, acceded to the
COL' t's conclusion on the validity of the
arrest and also enumerated the practical
problems in law enforcement if the
Court of Appeals' decision were allowed
to stand. Justice Powell concluded that
the Court's sustaining of the warrantless
arrest upon probable cause, " ... despite
the resulting divergence between the
constitutional rule governing searches
and that now held applicable to seizures
of the person ... " was justified. Watson,
44 L.w. 4112, 4118 (1976).
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, filed a dissenting opinion,
based on the thesis that the Court did not
decide the case on the narrow question
presented. Justice Marshall determined
that the arrest was valid since exiger.t circumstances were present (the officers
had knowledge that a felony was being
committed in their presence and that the
suspect possessed the incriminating evidence).
However, Justice Marshall criticized
the historical precedent which the Court
relied upon in approving the arrest of
Watson. He analyzed common law principles and concluded that " ... the lesson
of the common law, and those courts in
this country that have accepted its rule, is
an ambiguous one ... ", further, he
criticized the Court's "unblinking
literalism" in its analysis. Watson, 44
L.w. 4112, 4121 (1976).
Next, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), as authority, Justice
Marshall was critical of the deference the
Court pays to state and federal statutes
which have codified the common law
rule. He emphasized that the existence
of a statute is no defense to an unconstitutional practice.
He then examined the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Marshall agreed with Justice
Powell that, logically, arrests and
searches should be treated similarly in
regard to this warrant requirement. The
privacy rights of citizens are certainly better protected when a warrant is required
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for an arrest. Further, the legitimate governmental interest in law enforcement is
not unduly burdened by this requirement. In sum, when a warrant can be
procured, it should be. Justice Marshall
stated, "I believe the proper result is application of the warrant requirement, as
it has developed in the search context, to
all arrests." Watson, 44 L. W. 4112,
4124-4125 (1976). In reference to the
search issue, Justice Marshall suggested
that because it was of some complexity
and had not been thoroughly briefed for
the Court, the issue should be remanded.

•

consequently, they lack standing to challenge the torture of A.
4. It is not constitutionally required,
even in a serious felony prosecution, for
a state to require a twelve-person jury or
a unanimous verdict of the jurors.
Answer: True. Neither is necessary for
the interposition of the "commonsense
judgment" of a group of laymen between the accused and his accuser.
5. The Fifth Amendment privilege
against sefl-incrimination can be invoked by a witness at a Congressional
inquiry.
Answer: True. Unless the witness is
granted immunity, as was John Dean
when he testified before the Watergate
Committee.

Constitutional Quiz

6. The Constitution vests the entire
"power of pardon and reprieves for offenses" against the United States in the
President.

by Ronald Shapiro

Answer: True. Except in cases of impeachment.

1. One spouse's consent to a search of
the family reSidence, if voluntary and intelligent, renders the search valid, even if
it was made without a warrent, without
probable cause and without a warning
from the police that such a search can
legally be refused.
Answer: True. Anyone with control over
the premises can consent to its search;
knowledge of the legal right to refuse is
not always required for a valid consent.
2. Police have rented a hotel room
next to a room in which they have probable cause to believe a major narcotics
sale will take place. They may, without a
warrant, place a device on the wall of
their room to overhear the talk in the
next room.

7. A state judge's salary is immune
from federal income tax.
Answer: False. The income tax has no
real impact on the state's sovereign functions.
8. Actions by a state which give preference to local commerce over commerce from out of state are prohibited.
Answer: True, unless Congress permits
such preferences in the legislation governing such commerce.
9. The burning of draft cards is a protected form of free speech under the First
Amendment and thus cannot constitutionally be prosecuted.

Answer: False. The police must obtain a
court order.

Answer: False. Merely because the person burning the draft card thereby intends to express an idea, his conduct is
not considered speech protected by the
First Amendment.

3. Police arrest A, physically torture
him, and obtain a statement revealing
the location of evidence implicating B
and C as well as A in a robbery. The evidence is admissible against Band C.

10. The abstract advocacy of a
doctrine - even that the government
should be forcibly overthrown - is constitutionally protected as free speech.

Answer: True. The Fourth Amendment
rights of Band C have not been violated;

Answer: True. A "clear and present
danger of violence" is not presented.

